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Rhymes v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 4 (March 24, 2005)1
EVIDENCE - PRIOR BAD ACTS
Summary
Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, on charges of
lewdness with a minor under the age of fourteen.
Disposition
Affirmed. The Court concluded that the district court properly admitted evidence
of the defendant's prior bad acts, but that the district court erred by failing to give a
limiting instruction related to the uncharged bad acts evidence at the time the evidence
was introduced. The Court held that when evidence of prior bad acts relates to bad acts
that are uncharged in the case at bar, instructions must be given both at the time the
evidence is admitted and again during jury instructions. Even though the district court
failed to give a limiting instruction at the time the uncharged bad acts evidence was
introduced, the Court concluded that the failure to give such an instruction constituted
harmless error.
Factual and Procedural History
On December 7, 2001, Defendant/Appellant Michael Rhymes was living with
Irene Vela, her daughter, and her three sons. Vela's daughter invited a twelve-year-old
friend (the victim) to spend the night at Vela's house. The victim awoke when she felt
her pajama bottoms being pulled down and saw Rhymes lying next to her. Rhymes told
her that he had taken massage classes as he massaged her leg. She told Rhymes to stop,
then woke Vela's daughter and attempted to return to the victim's apartment. She told
Vela's daughter about what had happened.
After returning home, the victim told her mother what happened. The mother
called the police, who interviewed Vela's daughter and the victim. The girls corroborated
each other's stories. The victim underwent a sexual assault exam, the results of which
were negative. Police also interviewed Rhymes, who denied touching the victim.
Rhymes was subsequently charged with one count of lewdness with a child under the age
of fourteen.
Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of other bad acts for which
Rhymes was not presently being charged, asserting that the acts were admissible to show
intent and the absence of mistake. To show his prior bad acts, the State called two
witnesses who had filed sexual misconduct complaints against Rhymes in the past. Both
women alleged that Rhymes, while giving them massages, committed acts of sexual
misconduct against them. In a separate case, the State charged Rhymes with sexual
misconduct as a result of these allegations.
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The district court admitted the evidence based on the State's argument that it was
relevant to establish intent and that there was a similarity between the prior bad acts and
the acts alleged by the victim in the present case. It also determined that the probative
value of the prior bad acts evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to Rhymes. The court failed, however, to determine whether the State
proved the prior case by clear and convincing evidence. The court also neglected to give
the required limiting instruction when the prior bad acts evidence was introduced, but did
give such an instruction when the jury was charged.
Rhymes was convicted of lewdness with a minor under the age of fourteen and
was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after a minimum of ten
years. On appeal, Rhymes contended that the district court erred by: (1) failing to
conduct a hearing, pursuant to the requirements of Petrocelli v. State,2 to determine the
admissibility of the prior bad acts evidence; and (2) failing to give a limiting instruction
at the time the evidence was admitted at trial.
Discussion
1. Failure to hold a Petrocelli hearing.
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be introduced as proof of a
person's character, but may be introduced to prove, inter alia, intent and absence of
mistake or accident.3 Prior bad acts evidence, however, is looked upon with disfavor
because such evidence is often irrelevant and prejudicial. Consequently, it is presumed to
be inadmissible and the State bears the burden of requesting that the evidence be admitted
and establishing its admissibility.4 To do this, the State must demonstrate at a hearing
outside the jury’s presence that: (1) the prior incident is relevant to the present crime; (2)
the prior act is proven by clear and convincing evidence; and (3) the probative value of
the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.5
The trial court has the discretion to admit or exclude prior bad acts evidence, and
its ruling will stand absent a showing that its decision was manifestly incorrect.6 If the
court fails to conduct the requisite pre-admission hearing, such failure is reversible error
unless: (1) the record is sufficient for the Nevada Supreme Court to determine that the
evidence is admissible pursuant to the Tinch standard; or (2) the result would have been
the same if the lower court did not admit the evidence.7
In Rhymes, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the trial court conducted the
necessary Petrocelli hearing and determined that the prior bad acts testimony was
relevant as to both intent and similarity and that its probative value outweighed its
prejudicial effect, but that the court failed to determine that the prior bad acts were
proven by clear and convincing evidence. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the
record sufficiently established the occurrence of the prior bad acts by clear and
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convincing evidence. Moreover, the district court's determination that the bad acts
evidence was relevant was not manifestly erroneous, so the evidence was properly
admitted in this case.
2. The district court's failure to give a limiting instruction at the time the evidence
was admitted.
The district court failed to give the jury a limiting instruction at the time the bad
acts evidence was introduced. The Nevada Supreme Court held that this was a harmless
error because the court gave the jury a limiting instruction prior to being charged. When
uncharged bad acts are admitted into evidence, a limiting instruction should be given both
at the time of admission and in the trial court's final charge to the jury.8 The requirement
of instruction upon admission is important because it allows the instruction to take effect
prior to the jury's becoming accustomed to thinking of it in terms of the inadmissible
purpose of the evidence.9 Nevertheless, if a court fails to give such a limiting instruction,
that failure is harmless if the error did not have a substantial, injurious effect, or if it did
not influence the jury's verdict.10
In Rhymes, the State contended that Tavares was distinguishable from the present
case because in Tavares, the defendant never faced charges for the commission of the
prior bad acts, but the defendant in Rhymes did, in fact, face charges for the prior bad
acts. The Court disagreed, noting that the term "uncharged bad acts" refers to any acts
uncharged in the instant case, and does not refer to any prior bad acts that were never
charged in any case. The Court stated that the fact that prior bad acts have been charged
in another case does not relieve the State of its burden of requesting a limiting instruction
prior to the admission of bad acts evidence, nor does it relieve the trial court of its burden
of giving the instruction sua sponte if the State fails to request such an instruction.
The Court held that even though the trial court failed to give a limiting instruction
at the time of the admission of prior bad acts evidence, it gave the instruction at the time
the jury was charged. The jury was instructed that the evidence could only be considered
for the purposes of proving intent and similarity. Because the jury received the
instruction prior to deliberation, and because there was uncertainty as to whether the prior
bad acts were "uncharged bad acts," the district court's failure to give an instruction at the
time of admission of the evidence did not substantially affect Rhymes' rights.
Conclusion
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it failed
to expressly determine if the State proved the occurrence of Rhymes' prior bad acts by
clear and convincing evidence, but that the failure constituted harmless error because the
record sufficiently demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Rhymes
committed the prior bad acts. Moreover, the Court found that the district court erred by
failing to give the jury a limiting instruction at the time the prior bad acts evidence was
introduced, but that such error was harmless because the jury received such an instruction
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prior to being charged. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Rhymes requested such
an instruction at the time the evidence was admitted. If he had, the district court would
have been obligated to give the instruction. Thus, the Court affirmed the conviction.

